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Africa Report



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Cyrille Adoula

—UN photo

MARTYRDOM IN THE CONGO

In life, Dag Hammarskjöld was sometimes strongly criticized and misunderstood in Africa. With his death, midway in a UN military initiative to bring Katanga into the Congo fold that had wide African approval, the late Secretary-General has become Africa's second martyr of 1961.

The Ethiopian State Radio was one of many official information media to eulogize, in a spirit of eulogy, Lumumba's "dedication of his life to the freedom of his country" with Hammarskjöld's "devotion of his life to the cause of world peace and the spirit of humanity." The Premier of Nigeria's Western Region, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, described the Secretary-General's death as "the greatest loss the world has sustained in the present century." In Cairo, where there is public regret that the UAR withdrew its forces prematurely from the Congo earlier this year, a leading daily gave Hammarskjöld full credit for the UN Emergency Force which "has shielded Egypt from Jewish incursions" since 1956. In capitals as ideologically varied as Cairo, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Accra, Conakry, Khartoum, Leopoldville, and Lomé, the reaction has been one of genuine grief, anxiety for the future—and anger.

Since only the Soviet Union and its allies profit from Hammarskjöld's departure from the world scene, it seems a bitter irony that African anger and suspicion should focus on Britain—which has so much to lose by his death. The extreme charges of the *Ghanaian Times*—that Hammarskjöld "was the victim of a deliberate attack engineered by Britain and executed by Sir Roy Welensky and that African traitor, Moise Tshombe"—lost credence once full details of the crash were obtained. But there remains an aura of mystery about Hammarskjöld's last hours, which, as the *Economist's* Cairo correspondent reported, is creating a myth "which any number of inquiries will not be able to scotch completely." Even among those moderate Africans who have examined the facts and fully exonerated the British from the wilder charges of a plot, there is an almost universal belief that London bears heavy responsibility for the political situation which caused the Secretary-General to be flying unescorted over forests in Northern Rhodesia in the middle of the night of September 17.

Any African who read the London press during the first three weeks of September knows that there was highly emotional dissent in Britain's Conservative Party and in the British-governed Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Mr. Hammarskjöld's judgement that the United Nations could not equivocate much longer on the integration of Katanga if the fragile Adoula-Gizenga government so painstakingly put together at the center was to be preserved. It was on the basis of this rationale—which, in turn, is based on the assumption that it is the consensus of world opinion that the common interest is served by a unified Congo—that the UN began its low-keyed pacification of Katanga during the last week of August.

On August 24, responding to a request from Prime Minister Adoula, the United Nations agreed to assist in the implementation of the new Congolese Government's Ordinance No. 70, providing for the expulsion of all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries—mostly Belgian, French, Rhodesian, and South African whites—serving the Katangese government. To quiet panic resulting from false rumors spread among Katangese about planeloads of central government troops enroute to attack Elizabethville and about to disarm the Katanga armed forces, the UN on August 28 took over—without casualties—the Elizabethville postoffice, Radio Katanga, and other key installations in the provincial capital through which rumors could be spread. UN commanders on the ground were at this point optimistic that, as soon as the mercenaries were out of the way, Katanga would integrate peacefully.

The British Government, doubtless influenced by the mounting tide of opposition within the Conservative Party and its press to a UN "aggressive war" against what Conservatives regard as the one proven pro-Western figure in the Congo, pressed the Secretary General to explore again all peaceful alternatives. For the next 10 days, the UN forces in Elizabethville marked time while awaiting political decisions from New York on their next step; this gave Katanga time to get its second wind. By the September 9 deadline set for the evacuation of all foreign military personnel from Katanga, only 338 foreign officers and mercenaries had reported for repatriation, while, according to UN sources, at least 104 others had gone underground to organize civilian opposition and reorganize the Katanga Army for an all-out stand against the UN. On September 12, the Foreign Minister of Katanga announced that negotiations had been opened for reinforcing Katangese units with personnel and equipment from Rhodesia.

When the UN forces, in the early hours of September 13, "deemed it necessary to prevent inflammatory broadcasts or other threats to the maintenance of law and order while the United Nations resumed carrying out its task of apprehending and evacuating foreign military and paramilitary personnel," the Katangese launched a bitter counter-attack. In the ensuing battle, the outnumbered UN force suffered heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw. Hammarskjöld thereupon undertook his fatal journey to Ndola to negotiate with Mr. Tshombe. An uncertain cease-fire has now been arranged while both sides again await political decisions—and reinforce their respective military capabilities.

Was the UN operating within its mandate in Katanga? Congolese Prime Minister Adoula, blaming Hammarskjöld's "ignoble assassination" on "capitalist imperialism," is satisfied that it was. In London, the British Government reminded the world on September 21 that it has consistently supported materially and morally the UN policy in the Congo as laid down by successive resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but reaffirmed its position that "unity must be brought about by peaceful constitutional measures and not by intimidation or violence. . . ."

In Washington, the tendency was toward a pragmatic view of the situation. The liberal *New Republic*, reflecting what seemed to be close to the official position, put it this way:

"Those who say that the UN intervention is illegal, must answer the question of who is to judge, apart from the members of the UN themselves, what the UN may or may not do. Thus far, neither the Security Council nor the Assembly nor even a significant minority of nations in either body has questioned the legality of what the UN has done. The UN operation derives from a fairly precise Security Council directive of July 21, 1961, authorizing the Secretary-General to use force if necessary in the last resort to prevent civil war in the Congo. . . . It should be recognized that much of the opposition to the UN role in the Congo comes from those who cannot stomach Adoula (and his ties with Gizenga) but find Tshombe digestible."

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Kenyatta's Three Alternatives

CARL G. ROSBERG, Jr.*

Nairobi, Kenya

After nearly nine years in detention and restriction, Jomo Kenyatta was allowed to return to his house at Gatundu, a Kikuyu rural area some 20 miles from Nairobi, on August 14. His release from restriction in the remote Northern Province is an event of major importance, for it has become increasingly evident that no political settlement of Kenya's problems could be achieved at this time without his participation and sanction.

Though divorced from Kenya's political life until recent months, the image of his leadership has come to dominate all considerations. The intense campaign conducted by African nationalist leaders during the past two years for his release has had the effect of elevating Kenyatta to the position of the paramount leader and endowing his very name with a mystique.

To the vast majority of Kenya Africans, Kenyatta has become the father and symbol of their nationalism. At political meetings his name has invariably been linked with the cry for freedom—*Uhuru na Kenyatta*. He returns thus as no ordinary leader, but in command of immense authority.

Changes Since 1952

The political world of Kenya and of greater East Africa is enormously different from that of October 1952, when Kenyatta was detained at the beginning of the Emergency. Whereas no administrator or settler could envisage at that time self-government and independence under African rule and few understood the motives and methods of nationalism, African politics and predominance are now accepted as legitimate. Though the colonial government still rules, it has become increasingly a political one with an African now as Leader of Government Business.

Major psychological adjustments have taken place in race relations as the reality and ideology of white dominance in the social and political order has declined. Since the Lancaster House Conference of February 1960, no longer has the major issue been the direction of political change, but rather the pace of change in the achievement of independence. The policies of multi-racialism incorporated in the "Lyttelton" and "Lennox-Boyd" constitutions of 1954 and 1957



Jomo Kenyatta upon his release from detention.

—Pictorial Parade

have given way to a recognition of African majority rule.

A decisive factor inhibiting African nationalism from fully consolidating its achievements and rapidly advancing toward self-government and independence has been the lack of a unified nationalist movement. Indeed, the accomplishments of an African majority in the Legislative Council at the Lancaster House Conference came less from the pressure of an organized and unified nationalism than from the potential of such a movement.

While African leaders presented a united front at the Lancaster House Conference, the unity achieved was exceedingly fragile and quickly dissolved in the following months. Having achieved a commanding position in the constitution without having solved the problem of leadership, they were immediately plunged into a struggle for power among themselves.

One manifestation of this struggle was the formation of two separate national African parties in May and June 1960—the Kenya African National Union (KANU), led by James Gichuru, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), led by Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro. Although they tended to oppose overtly one another in the general election of February 1961, essentially they clashed in only a few constituencies, for each commanded support from committed tribal areas.

Of the two, KANU was the dominant party from the beginning; it was strong not only in the urban areas, but also in crowded reserves of large tribes—the Luo, Kamba, Kikuyu and associated tribes. It regarded itself as the successor of the Kenya African Union and the true embodiment of African nationalism. Commanding widespread support, it had every expectation of participating in forming the first government under the Lancaster House Constitution.

KADU in Minority

KADU, on the other hand, was formed fundamentally as an alliance of agrarian tribes drawn together mainly through fear of being absorbed by the KANU tribes. From the beginning, KADU sought coherence of purpose by placing a major emphasis on being "democratic," and it succeeded in developing a corporate concept of leadership and responsibility. Despite the fact that it cooperated in forming a national government after the general elections with some support of the non-African elected leaders and the colonial administration, its attitude and approach to politics remain temperamentally those of an opposition party.

Although KANU's popular vote was nearly four times that of KADU in the general election of February 1961, and it secured 19 constituency seats in the Legislative Council to KADU's 11, KANU was inhibited from translating its electoral power into governmental authority. For the colonial government remained adamant in its refusal to entertain the release of Kenyatta until a government was formed and found workable. In the politics of KANU, Kenyatta's leadership and release from restriction had become the central issue of the election. Thus, deadlock was rapidly reached, and KANU went into opposition when KADU formed a national government in late April.

The crucial significance of the Kenyatta issue in KANU politics has arisen in large part from the kind of party it sought to become. Unlike KADU, KANU attempted to build a mass unitary party with Kenyatta as the leader. Since the colonial government refused to register the party with Kenyatta as the leader, James Gichuru, the former president of the Kenya African Union before Kenyatta took command of the party in 1947, became president. It was thus believed that Gichuru was acting in his historic role—that is, temporarily holding the office until the return of the true leader.

This leadership arrangement essentially failed in terms of building a unified and effective mass party, for KANU needed something more than

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an image and symbol of leader. It required a leader with authority able to make decisions which would not be questioned. The dilemma was that only Kenyatta possessed this effective authority, and he was absent from the political arena. Moreover, none of KANU's senior leaders—Gichuru, Mboya, or Odinga—could claim to share Kenyatta's authority. If any made a positive bid for power he would be accused as a usurper of Kenyatta's place.

In this situation, a bitter politics of maneuvering dominated the political scene, with each major leader struggling to get into the best possible position before Kenyatta was released. As this struggle intensified during the election campaign, the authority of Kenyatta was enhanced, and it also became more and more apparent that no solution to the leadership problem could occur until Kenyatta was released. Unity and stability could only be achieved through the authority of Kenyatta.

Kenyatta and KADU

To KADU, the leadership of Kenyatta and his release from restriction were two separate issues. While demanding the release of Kenyatta, as well as other detainees, KADU was neither committed to his leadership nor to his unconditional release from restriction as a condition of their participation in forming a government. However, in breaking the deadlock that had developed between the colonial government and KANU in March and April, KADU leaders had to demonstrate that they were as concerned as KANU for his immediate release if they were going to have any hope of broadening their base of power. The concession KADU obtained was that a house would be built for Kenyatta at Gatundu and it was implied that his release would take place upon its completion.

Maneuver Fails

Possessing only minority support from the newly enfranchised electorate, the "KADU government" had to be able to detach a few of KANU's parliamentary members and win their support, if they were to establish a stable government. In this endeavor they failed, for only one KANU member joined the ranks of the government. Thus, in meeting the continued onslaughts of KANU in the Legislative Council during May and early June, KADU had to rely upon the votes of the members nominated by the Governor in order to command a majority.

On the opposition benches sat the frustrated KANU parliamentary group, unable to dislodge the "KADU government" by constitutional means. This frustration appeared to be leading to a situation of growing instability in which party actions could intensify tribal differences, thus threatening possibilities of achieving a national identity.

Kenyatta's decision in mid-June to call a meeting of the leaders of both parties at his place of restriction at Maralal forcefully brought to an end the deteriorating situation and provided a framework for a national approach to Kenya's problem.

The first fruits of this new unity were the successful joint efforts of KANU/KADU at the London Conference in late June on the future of the East African common market and common services. Following this conference, the leaders of both parties met with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and discussed steps toward independence.

The unity of KADU and KANU was not long-standing, however, for the issue soon arose as to which party was to lead Kenya to independence. The dilemma of KADU as a minority party nominally in charge of the government was that any steps in preparation for independence which would result in a new election, would bring a demise of KADU's power. KANU, as a majority party, was eager for new elections as soon as possible. As a result of these conflicting positions, postponements ensued, preventing a discussion of Kenya's political future by the parties.

Kenyatta Emerges

With the parties still at loggerheads, Kenyatta was brought from restriction at Maralal to Gatundu. In less than a week after his release, a KANU/KADU delegation met and issued a statement that they had come to an agreed position on several major issues. Their joint proposals, subsequently presented to Governor Sir Patrick Renison during the last week of August, called for full independence by February 1962, with an interim coalition government moving straight to full internal self-government and bypassing the Chief Minister stage stipulated at the 1960 Lancaster House constitutional conference. The KANU-KADU joint committee also requested elections before independence and urgent steps to end the British agreement with Zanzibar over the coastal strip.

The release of Kenyatta opens up a whole new stage in Kenya's political development. As the accepted leader, he will be faced with two fundamental problems: (1) to advance Kenya from a tribal to a national outlook; and (2) to redirect the endeavors of the leaders of the two major national parties from inter- and intra-party struggles to the resolution of national problems. On the broader horizon is the task of building an East African Federation. In meeting the challenges of these problems, what tactics can one expect that Kenyatta will employ and what will be the effect of these tactics on the current Kenya political situation?

Briefly, there are at least three possible tactics from which Kenyatta might choose:

He could adopt the role of a strong,

direct, and all-pervasive leader, undertaking to make all major decisions himself.

Secondly, he could conclude that the preservation of his image and authority is as important as the resolution of difficult problems, and thus concentrate on maintaining a diffused, detached leadership.

Or Kenyatta could assume the role of a political personality on a par and competing with all other political leaders.

Third Party Unlikely

Although Kenyatta reportedly threatened on September 17 to form a third political party if KANU and KADU do not soon come to a working agreement, there is very little evidence in his past to suggest that he would actually adopt either the first or third alternatives. His character and previous record suggest that he would be more likely to choose a diffused and detached leadership role, with decisions reached by consensus among recognized leaders within a frame of reference set by the paramount leader and ratified by him.

The African leaders are waiting and watching as Kenyatta weighs each of these alternatives. During this interval, they are also weighing the alternatives and the consequences of each to themselves. The third alternative, which puts Kenyatta on a par with other leaders, is certainly preferable to any leader who wishes to enter into a power struggle with Kenyatta; but, under present conditions, there are very few willing or able to take this risk. Moreover, there is a recognition that this course could lead to continued disunity and intense conflict.

Strong and centralized leadership would put others who are seeking a dominant role into eclipse; would instill fear on the part of racial and tribal minorities; but would bring comfort to the "true believers."

The detached-consensual approach would probably command the broadest support: it would give a sense of security to the racial and tribal minorities who would have a share in the decision-making process, and it would provide a partially satisfying role for those seeking to be dominant policymakers. Successfully implemented, this third approach could provide stability for Kenya and an alternative to the emergence of an authoritarian state.

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The Political Outlook in Zanzibar

ROBERT ROTBERG*

A series of ugly political murders has kept this once-peaceful British protectorate in a state of anxious tension since bloody racial rioting between Zanzibar's Arab minority and its African majority was quelled in June. Although the three political parties have continued to debate matters of the day in the islands' Legislative Council with a surprising modicum of calm and mutual cooperation, the riots have left these islands with an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which will slow the attainment of independence, cloud Zanzibar's future in an East African Federation, and thwart plans for rapid economic development. Unity, always so problematical in this tight community, is now even more difficult to envisage.

Zanzibar attained responsible government in June after an hiatus caused by January's election deadlock. (See *Africa Report*, July 1961, page 11). In the June ballot, the Arab-led Zanzibar Nationalist Party and its bitter opponent, the Afro-Shirazi Party, each won 10 seats. The Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party, which had a pre-election alliance with the ZNP, were victors in three constituencies on Pemba Island.

Compromise Reached

After much maneuvering and some skillful negotiating by the British Resident, Sir George Mooring, the ZNP-ZPPP alliance became responsible for government business here. Sheikh Ali Muhsin, leader of the ZNP and Zanzibar's most outstanding political figure, ensured the stability of the alliance by stepping aside to allow the ZPPP leader, Sheikh Muhammed Shamte, a Pemba landlord and a teacher for 25 years, to become chief minister. Sheikh Ali, an agriculture graduate of Makerere College, accepted the education portfolio, but it is accepted that he is the effective chief minister.

The opposition party, led by Sheikh Othman Shariff Musa, a 45-year old former agricultural officer of quick intelligence, and Abeid Karume, an uneducated but sagacious former boatman, has concentrated its legislative attack on minor points in the government's budget proposals. In the Committee of Supply, its criticisms have seemed largely contrived and Sheikh Othman has said that his party's main tactic must necessarily be one of continuous obstruction.

Both main parties have condemned political atrocities. They have jointly

supported a post-election nine p.m. to dawn curfew, which was reimposed in August after three murders in two weeks. Politicians and officials alike fear a wave of vendettas should armed troops be withdrawn from encampments here. In September, Britain replaced askaris of the Kings African Rifles with two companies of Coldstream Guards, flown here from Kuwait and Bahrain. They are likely to remain, in some strength, for nine months or more.

The Historical Context

Until June 1 there had been tension, but it had hardly ever been expressed by communal violence. Forty thousand Arabs—a settler problem of a special sort—have for long been an upper class of landlords, merchants, and civil servants on these coral islands off the coast of Tanganyika. The major population group—more than 240,000 of mixed African descent—are divided among themselves but united in their dislike of the more sophisticated Arabs. Eighteen thousand Asians, Comorians, and Goans, and 500 whites, watch from the sidelines.

The black majority is divided into three groups. There are the descendants of slaves brought from Nyasaland and Tanganyika—generally the poorest settled class. There are immigrant African clovepickers from the mainland, most of whom cross 22 miles of Indian Ocean for seasonal work. And there are about 140,000—known as Shirazis—who claim to be the indigenous inhabitants of the protectorate. These Shirazis, distinguishable culturally rather than physically, trace their ancestry partially from Persian settlers who came south about 10 centuries ago with Prince Hassan bin Ali of Shiraz.

For a century or more, the black majority has labored for Arabs. Today Arabs are among the wealthiest of the absentee landlords and much of the clove and coconut crop on which Zanzibar depends is owned by Arabs who sit in Zanzibar city. The local police and civil service are largely staffed by Arabs and Asians and few Africans, perhaps because of their lower educational attainments, have been employed by government.

How Conflict Was Triggered

Racial conflict, which for long had been latent, and which was certainly exacerbated by the bitter campaign waged by the two main parties, was triggered by alleged voting irregularities in the Darajani constituency of Zanzibar city on June 1. By noon time, a marginal contest had gathered a large armed crowd which set upon suspicious voters, particularly those who were thought to be from a different constituency or those who were thought to have voted earlier in the

day. Soon after noon, the Riot Act was read and armed troops were called.

Zanzibar's small and inexperienced police force was unable to control the rioting and by the next day racial violence had spread rapidly throughout the main island. Before 200 Kenya riot police and two companies of the Kings African Rifles could be flown from Kenya and Tanganyika to quell the disturbances, several days of conflict had resulted in 67 deaths (only two African) and about 3,000 wounded. Patrols still make the rounds of potential trouble areas, primarily to prevent Arabs from wreaking vengeance on isolated Africans.

The Sultan's Changing Role

For almost five decades, the sultanate was regarded as a unifying



Sheikh Ali Muhsin, leader of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.

—M. I. Fernandez

institution. In recent months, however, the present Sultan, Seyyid Sir Abdullah bin Khalifa, has forfeited his late father's universal respect and approbation. The Afro-Shirazi Party accuses the Sultan of partiality to the ZNP, basing its suspicion on the pro-nationalist activities of the Sultan's son. Yet both parties still expect the present Sultan to become a quiet constitutional monarch whenever independence is achieved.

The three political parties talk of independence for Zanzibar by December 1961, although they know any early breakaway from Great Britain will be impossible before their own internal differences are settled. The riots naturally made independence more difficult for British colonial servants to justify. Both the Resident and his deputy, the Civil Secretary, have made it abundantly clear that, as much as Britain wants to devolve its responsibilities onto Zanzibari shoulders, British protection will not be withdrawn until there is some

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assurance that parliamentary government will continue harmoniously and that violence will not be used for political ends.

Sheikh Ali agrees that parliamentary government is indeed on trial here. And he is not sure it will last. Always a realist, he says he can easily foresee the need for some strong government in Zanzibar. At the same time, he says he sincerely wants party government on the British pattern to continue and he knows that some form of reconciliation between parties is necessary before Zanzibar can be independent.

But the ASP distrusts Sheikh Ali and his wily lieutenant, Abdul Rahman (Babu) Mohammed. Sheikh Othman and his supporters, independent observers here, and Julius Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union on the mainland all accuse Sheikh Ali and his party of Communist domination. Sheikh Othman goes so far as to accuse four ZNP members of being card-carrying Communists.

Sheikh Ali Examined

Is Zanzibar another Cuba? Sheikh Ali vigorously denies being more than a clever opportunist, and British officials and informed local observers—who should know—share his candor. Sheikh Ali, now 42, freely admits that the ZNP has received some financial assistance and scholarship aid from Communist China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. Its daily mimeographed *Zanews*, edited by Babu, is replete with articles from the Communist press and particularly from Hsinua, the Chinese Communist news agency. One day in August, *Zanews* carried a Chinese report on capitalist suppression of Bolivian tin miners and called the American Consulate "a hot-bed of anti-Khrushchev intrigue." The ZNP also sells Communist literature here. It circulates openly.

The Zanzibar Nationalist Party has taken a strong anti-American position ever since a Project Mercury tracking station was established here last year. The initial public relations was badly handled and suspicions immediately were aroused that atomic missiles would be established on Zanzibar's "neutral soil." The United States simply wishes a place from which to look for its own space men, but no amount of patient explanation has persuaded the ZNP and *Zanews* to cease cudgeling this straw man.

The ZNP also criticized the re-opening, after 46 years, of the American Consulate here. *Zanews* has carried continuous unfavorable comment and the party's vituperation may well have encouraged irresponsible elements to throw those petrol bombs which marred the consulate's opening on August 30. Sheikh Ali, however, joined other ministers in quickly condemning the outrage and the opening-day reception was well attended. It seems to me that Sheikh Ali

and his party are sincere in their determination to establish independent integrity for Zanzibar. No matter how often the ZNP leader talks tough about the United States or Great Britain, it still appears that he seeks to win debating points rather than serious games. As an earnest of his openness, he harbors a wistful desire to be invited officially to visit America. He will certainly continue to be critical of the United States and the West, and no one should expect him to speak favorably of the "imperialist powers." His actions may be less uncomprising, however.

ZNP Attitudes Toward Federation

With respect to an East African Federation, Sheikh Ali holds the view that Zanzibar must consider the pros and cons of participation carefully. He realizes that Zanzibar would be hopelessly cut off without strong links to the mainland (the protectorate now is an associate member of the East African High Commission), but Zanzibar could hold out for equal representation in any East African parliament. Rejection of this demand could drive a ZNP-led Zanzibar further East.

Zanzibar's attitude towards Federation will also depend on a solution to the problem of the Kenya Strip. In 1895, Great Britain rented (at £1,100 per annum) a 10-mile wide strip from the Tanganyika border to the Tana River from the Sultan of Zanzibar. Kenya's politicians want the strip to remain Kenyan, and Zanzibaris naturally want to reclaim it or to receive sufficient payment to recompense the protectorate for its loss. Some compromise, perhaps status as a federal zone (with Mombasa as federal capital?), is a possibility.

The Afro-Shirazi Position

The Afro-Shirazi Party also does not cherish an East African Federation. Only three percent of the Zanzibar population is non-Moslem, and the ASP fears being engulfed by a predominantly Christian federation. Indeed, the ASP has only recently favored rapid independence for this protectorate.

The Afro-Shirazi Party was formed in 1957, two years after the Arab Association became the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, to contest the protectorate's first elections in July of that year. It resulted from the coalition of the African Association (predominantly a social club for migrant workers) and the Shirazi Association, at best a proto-political organization.

It now draws its strength from workers in Zanzibar city and from the semi-literate clove and coconut growers of the two main islands. Prior to the June elections and the abortive January vote, it campaigned on a black racist platform in contrast to the ZNP's multi-racial approach. (The ZNP returned five Arabs, two Africans, two Comorians, and one Indian in the June balloting.)

In the 1957 election, the ASP won five of six seats, although it only obtained three percent more of the total vote than did the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, which had campaigned vigorously for immediate self-government. (The ASP opposed such political advance, for it feared that the African majority would be unable to compete successfully with the better-educated Arabs.)

Six months after assuming legislative office, three of the five ASP members of the legislative council, including Sheikh Muhammed, left the party to form the islands' third party, the Shirazi Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party. They opposed Abeid Karume's "dictatorial methods" as president of the Afro-Shirazi Party, and sought equality for Pemba in protectorate affairs.

In the January 1961 elections, the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party won three seats and held an effective balance between the ASP, with 10, and the ZNP, nine. Two of the ZPPP members joined the ZNP and another joined ASP, contributing to a total stalemate in Zanzibar's 22-man Legislative Council. To resolve the dead-

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Africa House Governing Council: William Leo Hansberry, Chairman; William Seon, Secretary.

The Meaning Of Belgrade

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR AND ALFRED SHERMAN *

For the many Western well wishers of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, the meeting of the "non-aligned" in Belgrade came as a shock and their mortification has freely been voiced in Europe as well as in the US Senate.

Peregrine Worsthorne of the London *Daily Telegraph* concluded that "the more (the West) seeks to align its policies with the neutral nations, the more it seeks to woo them, the more they will be compelled to move eastward, so as to avoid the unwanted embrace . . . The truth is that if they are to retain their position in the middle they cannot afford to lag too far behind Soviet intransigence or to be overtaken too completely by Western moderation." Such an appraisal seemed uncomfortably close to realities. And yet, an attempt should be made to understand the underlying reasons for these attitudes.

How the World Looks

With certain exceptions, the non-aligned nations and the overwhelming majority of their populations see the world divided into three: the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc, and themselves. They feel they owe no loyalty to either of the two blocs but regard them as realities which pre-existed them, and with which they have no alternative but to coexist as best they can. The fact that some live under a political system broadly similar to Western democracy while others are developing societies which have many features in common with Communist states does not significantly influence their loyalties; Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, and U Nu feel much closer to each other than any one of them does to Britain, the Soviet Union, or China.

The two partial exceptions to this rule are Yugoslavia and Cuba. Tito's stand at the conference, which was the most obdurately anti-Western on all questions, should serve as a reminder that Yugoslavia is a Communist state, whose rulers explicitly consider it a member of the Sino-Soviet bloc as at present constituted and who still aspire to be accepted by it as an equal partner. They share the Communist world view on a whole range of theoretical and practical questions, together with a high degree of loyalty and emotional identification, while remaining determined to preserve their own sovereignty un-

diminished. The Cuban performance lent further weight to the belief that, for all practical purposes, the country's leaders at present are wholly identified with the Communist bloc and that their adherence to the flexible principle of non-alignment is a matter of temporary expediency.

The conference provided a revealing picture of the climate of opinion, sense of priorities, and limits of agreement among the non-aligned nations. Though world peace came first on the agenda, the dominant theme was the evil of Western colonialism. As one member of an African delegation remarked, many participants agreed intellectually with Premier Nehru when he stressed that the era of classic colonialism is dead, but few accepted his admonitions emotionally.

What grievances were aired were almost wholly against the West, and this is understandable. Africa has never experienced Soviet rule, or much in the way of Soviet pressure. Those few Asian states under serious Soviet or Chinese pressure are aligned with the West in defense pacts, and therefore were absent from the conference. The people of Soviet Asia have been too quiescent to evoke real feeling on this question among the Afro-Asians, whose views had obviously been formed by escorted trips. Grievances at the West, on the other hand, are still deeply imbedded, though it was noticeable that by and large those states which received their independence during the 1940's were considerably mellowed than the regimes of the 1950's.

Less than Full Agreement

On broader questions of international relations, opinions ranged from close support of the Soviet stand to a fair measure of agreement with Western policies. All Western observers could find to console them was the conference's rejection of a pro-Soviet stand on a number of major issues. Pressures from Tito, Nkrumah, and others for reorganization of the UN Secretariat along lines broadly similar to Soviet proposals was defeated, thanks partly to statesmanlike evaluation of the United Nation's role in the Congo by Premier Cyrille Adoula. Pressure from the same and other quarters for a declaration calling for recognition of the division of Germany into two sovereign states "as a fact of life" was also defeated.

Yet the main lesson to be learned from the Conference is that the attitudes of the non-aligned which seem to work in the Soviet favor are liable to prevail for some time, and may well gain further support in the un-

derdeveloped continents. This does not imply that Western policies have to be either passive or defeatist, that breastbeating for past sins will help or that the West should give up the non-aligned countries as hopeless—far from it. It means that Western policies will have to be set out from an awareness that because of their unique experience and problems, the non-aligned see things in a different light, and that only their own individual or collective experience can fundamentally change their views. Attempts to cajole these states, or railing against what appears to be hypocrisy, are bound to be self-defeating.

Strength Limited

If the West urgently needs to come to terms with non-alignment, however, the non-aligned countries themselves must examine its implications more critically. Mr. Nehru warned the conference to correctly "evaluate both our actual and potential strength and lack of strength; both have to be considered together."

Until now most states represented at Belgrade, and others like them, have come to identify the gradual shift in the balance of world power against the West with the rise of their own fortunes. But unless they come to recognize that they too are dependent on the balance of power for immunity from the Communist drive for world hegemony, they may find themselves sawing off the branch on which they sit. This is gradually being realized in some Asian and African capitals, but it is a slow process.

The West need not put all its trust in an increasing sophistication among neutral statesmen, for there are certain objective trends that are contributing to this education. The borders between the blocs in Europe are frozen; the Communist parties have steadily decreased in influence over the last decade and any Communist advance is now possible only by non-peaceful means, which in Europe would soon bring about a third world war. The only exception is, of course, Berlin, but this crisis, however dangerous, will not last forever. Once a solution, however tenuous, has been found for Berlin, it seems almost a foregone conclusion that the next crisis will erupt in Asia or Africa, where a generally unsettled state of affairs offers the Communists greater revolutionary opportunities and much more freedom of maneuver. It is another foregone conclusion that the Communist attitude toward the national bourgeoisie in Asia and Africa

(Continued on page 12)

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Taxes and Forced Savings in Ghana

To help finance the new £128,000,000 budget for 1961/62 introduced into Parliament on July 7, the Government of Ghana has enacted a series of precedent-breaking measures which will widen the tax base, increase revenue through new and increased taxes more efficiently collected, and introduce compulsory savings. Although the immediate purpose is to raise revenue, the creation of a more effective tax structure for Ghana and the forced savings plan are also designed to involve a larger part of Ghana's population in financing the country's development program. The government estimates that extra excise duties, the renovated income tax, a new purchase tax, a new property tax, and the new forced savings plan will amount to £32,000,000 in 1961/62. (See *News Review*, page 9, for discussion of political effects of the new regulations.)

These are the broad outlines of the new reforms:

• **Customs and Excise Taxes.** Almost half the increased revenue (an estimated £15,532,000) is expected to come from increased import and export duties. The import duty on wines, beers, and spiritous liquors is roughly doubled, the duty on firearms and ammunition is to be increased to from two to three times the present level, and the general level of duties on non-specified and non-exempt items is raised from 25 percent to 30 percent of their value. In addition to these increases on luxury items, there are also increases on cotton and artificial silk fabrics, tobacco, petroleum products, and some foods.

• **Purchase Tax.** Ghana's first sales tax, expected to bring in £2,000,000, is to be levied on apparel, tires and tubes, floor coverings, vehicles, and on certain consumer durable goods. The rate of tax varies: bicycles, 15 percent; sewing machines, typewriters, radios, tape recorders and record players, tires and tubes, stoves and cookers, wearing apparel (excluding underwear, hose, shoes, hats and gloves), and light electric appliances, all are taxed at 33½ percent; and furniture, refrigerators and air conditioners, musical instruments, floor coverings, watches and clocks, cameras and projectors, and household electrical equipment (vacuum cleaners, floor polishers, and washing machines) are taxed at 66 percent. The purchase tax on motor vehicles varies from 10 percent to 66 percent, depending on the vehicle's size.

• **Income Tax.** Changes in personal and company income tax are expected to bring in £2,500,000 additional revenue. The renovated personal income tax eliminates all allowances, which were formerly given for wife, chil-

dren, dependents, life insurance, and overseas passage, and provides for a single, graduated tax on income varying as follows:

| Total income per year | Tax as a percentage of income |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Up to £ 480 | No tax |
| £480- 960 | Up to 1.25% |
| £961- 1,920 | 1.25 to 3.13% |
| £1,921- 3,120 | 3.13 to 4.81% |
| £3,121- 4,320 | 4.81 to 6.25% |
| £4,321- 6,000 | 6.25 to 8.70% |
| £6,001- 9,600 | 8.70 to 12.94% |
| £9,601-15,000 | 12.94 to 19.08% |

The tax on many individuals will be lower under this schedule than before, but a greater total revenue is expected from it because the tax will now be deducted by the employer. The withholding system, new to Ghana, makes collection and enforcement more effective.

Tax assessment of company income has been changed and company income will now be assumed to be 7½ percent of the value of the company's turnover. The tax rate, applied to that income, remains unchanged at 40 percent. The 7½ percent may be appealed and recomputed, but in no case will the income of a company be assumed to be less than two percent of actual turnover. The government expects that this simplified procedure will lead to a more rapid and effective collection of the company income tax than before.

• **Compulsory Savings.** Perhaps the most stringent of the new measures is the Compulsory Savings Act, expected to bring in £11,000,000 in new revenue, which requires all individuals, employees, and companies to devote a certain percentage of their income to the purchase of Ghana National Development Bonds, issued mainly in five and six shilling denominations (1 shilling = approximately 14 US cents.)

The employees' contribution is approximately five percent of income for all who earn £10 per month and over, with the monthly contribution increasing by five shillings—that is, one quarter of a £—for each increase of £4 of income. Companies, individual traders and businessmen, and professional men will put 10 percent of their income into five shilling bonds. Cocoa farmers will buy one six shilling bond for each load of cocoa sold to the agents of the Cocoa Marketing Board, by law the only purchaser of cocoa in Ghana.

The bonds, which are not negotiable, mature in 10 years, at which time they pay about two to two and one-half percent compound interest on their initial price. However, there will be two drawings each year of one percent of the bonds outstanding; the winning bonds will be redeemed,

and their holders will receive cash prizes totalling at least three percent of the face value of total bonds outstanding. The bonds can be otherwise cashed only on retirement, on death of the holder, or by non-nationals leaving the country permanently.

• **Property Tax.** A new property tax on owner-occupied and rented buildings, to be introduced initially in Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast, Sekondi/Takoradi, and Tamale, and later extended to other areas, is expected to produce £500,000 of revenue in the first year. The tax is in addition to local property taxes, and will be levied at a rate of five percent on the first £500 rateable value, and 10 percent on the rateable value above that—the "rateable value" is one-twelfth of the building's cost. No tax will be levied on property with a rateable value of £50 or less. Thus, for property costing £600, there is no tax, and for property costing more, the tax on the first £6,000 is 0.42 percent and on any cost above this, the rate is 0.83 percent.

The new measures will mainly affect Ghanaians in middle and higher income levels. They will pay the bulk of the revenue from property taxes (which will fall mainly on owner-occupied houses above £600 cost), from customs duties on luxuries, from the personal income tax (beginning on incomes of £40 per month), and from the purchase tax on luxury goods.

However, the cost of living may rise for low-income Ghanaians as well, unless the government takes firm action to hold prices under control.

The forced savings program, which dips down to embrace earners of as little as £10 monthly, involves many Ghanaians who have heretofore had little direct experience with either taxation or institutional saving. While the forced saving plan is not actually a tax, it will be visible and unfamiliar to the low income group.

The effect of the new legislation on companies is difficult to assess. The method of company income tax collection and the statutory assumption that every company has an income amounting to at least two percent of its turnover will be hard on any firms making little or no profit. For the rest, however, the simplified method should create no special hardship. In its July 29 issue, *West Africa* reports that some companies, mainly in mining, are reconsidering proposed investments because of increased customs duties on products they use and because of the 10 percent compulsory savings requirement, but it is too early to know final business reaction for certain.

—Norman W. Mosher

Uganda Independence Discussed in London

The continuing fragmentation of Uganda politics was mirrored in the opening session of the country's constitutional conference in London on September 18, when more than 60 delegates sat down with Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod to lay plans for the next stage of Uganda's political evolution. It was one of the largest delegations ever gathered for a constitutional conference, comprising leaders of Uganda's several contending nationalist political parties, as well as the traditionalist leaders of the country's four constituent tribal kingdoms. Ranking African present was Uganda's Chief Minister, Benedicto Kiwanuka, leader of the minority Democratic Party, which formed a government after winning a technical victory in the March 1961 general election. (See *Africa Report*, April 1961, page 9).

The proposals put before the conference by Colonial Secretary Macleod follow the main recommendations for establishing a working relationship among Uganda's traditionalist and modernist elements set forth by the Munster Commission earlier this year. (See *Africa Report*, July 1961, page 9.) These call for a democratic constitution, but with provisions guaranteeing the status of traditional rulers. The Munster recommendation for a federal relationship between

Uganda's separatist-minded province, the Kingdom of Buganda, and the central government may elicit demands for equal treatment for the Kingdoms of Toro, Ankole, and Bunyoro, for which a somewhat ambiguous "semi-federal" status was suggested.

The most significant new element in the conference was the apparent working alliance reached between the representatives of Buganda and A. M. Obote's Uganda People's Congress, the principal opposition party in the Legislative Council. This was only one of several indications that the Baganda have concluded that they must sooner or later come to terms with the rest of Uganda. A Buganda-UPC alliance would assure Mr. Obote's victory in any pre-independence election; in exchange, apparently, the UPC would concede the right of Buganda's Lukiko (legislature) to choose Buganda's representatives in a future central Legislative Council without (as the Munster Commission recommended) democratizing itself first.

One of the stickier points to be worked out, in a session that observers expected to last for several weeks, is the precise financial relationship between Buganda, the country's largest and wealthiest province, and the central government. Thus it was still far from certain whether, despite Colonial Secretary Macleod's hopeful opening remarks, this was to be "the last major conference on Uganda's future before independence comes."

British Policy Shifts In Northern Rhodesia

During the third week of September, a tentative ray of optimism pierced the pall of disillusionment which settled on Northern Rhodesian African nationalists following Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod's June 26 announcement of significant limiting amendments to projected constitutional reforms for the Protectorate. (See *Africa Report*, July 1961, pages 9-10). The British Government, confronted with growing African unrest and increasingly vocal political pressures in London from its Labor opposition, a large segment of the press, and its own liberal wing, revised its position on September 18 and announced that it was now prepared to reconsider the constitutional issues.

The one condition stipulated by Colonial Secretary Macleod—that politically-inspired violence in the protectorate cease—would provide a severe test for Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party, whose dogged commitment to non-violence has imperiled his hold on his party in a summer of African frustration. For the wave of sabotage and disorder which began in July, resulting so far in at least 20 Africans dead and 2,000 under arrest, was as much a protest against Kaunda's moderation as against the British "betrayal" itself.

The *Manchester Guardian's* sympathetic commentary on Mr. Kaunda's present delicate position was widely echoed in the British press:

"It is difficult to recall a colonial leader who has been at such pains to take every chance of negotiation, to clarify every shade of meaning, to risk unpopularity with his followers by urging them to be patient, and to abase himself so frequently before the Colonial Office in the hope of wringing a change of heart. The government now finds itself faced with a leader who has no stomach for the long-drawn-out clashes which embitter a country on its way to self-government. Mr. Kaunda has tried to settle matters in a civilized way. It is a personal impertinence to him to suggest that he is responsible for events which were implicit in the government's own decisions. It is folly to put his leadership in jeopardy."

The original constitutional proposals set forth in the February White Paper would have assured a slim African majority in the 45-seat Legislative Council; the complex June amendments, products of strong intercessions in London by Northern Rhodesian white leaders, would make

Ghana's Nkrumah Faces Internal Crisis

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, resting at a Black Sea resort after the Belgrade Conference and a strenuous two months tour of the Sino-Soviet Bloc nations, flew hurriedly home to Accra on September 16 to cope with the gravest threat to his government and his party since independence in 1957. A major Nkrumah policy decision was under attack from both within and without the governing Convention People's Party, and by the last week in September it was still far from certain how it would end.

The situation was sparked by the traumatic 1961-62 budget introduced by President Nkrumah on July 4, just before his departure for a trip that took him away from Accra for nine weeks. The sweeping tax reforms and introduction of forced savings make sound economic sense for a country bent on rapid development (See "Taxes and Forced Savings in Ghana," p. 8, this issue), but Ghana's easygoing population was singularly unprepared to adjust to this degree of austerity without psychological preparation and follow-up. A general wage freeze further aroused public

anxiety and helped to catalyze protest actions.

Grumbling reached a serious stage on September 4, when dock and railway workers went on strike against forced savings at main ports and paralyzed the country's railway system for the next 18 days.

By September 24, London *Observer* correspondent Colin Legum summarized the situation thusly: "Although . . . President Nkrumah looks as if he has won the first round in his showdown with workers . . . his troubles are far from over. The . . . strike . . . is symptomatic of deep discontent in Ghana."

By the end of the month, it was clear that major changes in the power structure were underway. On September 25, the retirement of Major General H. T. Alexander, British Chief of Defense Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, was announced.

On September 28, President Nkrumah announced the dismissal of six prominent government officials including Minister of Health (and former Minister of Finance) K. A. Gbedemah, and Minister of Agriculture Kojo Botsio.

it more difficult, if not impossible, for Africans to gain such a majority. This was a particularly bitter pill to swallow at a time when neighboring Nyasaland was preparing for an election that was clearly to sweep Dr. Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress Party into a majority position, and render independence only a matter of time.

Kaunda's major demands, firmly endorsed by Sir John Moffat's Liberal Party, are two: (1) that Asians and Coloureds should not have a special "national" representative of their own, but should remain on the ordinary voters' roll; and (2) that the qualifying hurdle for "national" seat candidates should be five percent of the votes cast by members of each race (not, as proposed in June, 12½ percent or 400 votes, whichever is the least). There is very little hope, in many key areas, of the UNIP persuading 12½ percent of the Europeans to vote its ticket, while no one doubts the ability of the governing party—European or no—to secure 400 African votes in any constituency.

Dr. Banda's Party Wins in Nyasaland

The Malawi Congress Party, led by Dr. Hastings Banda, scored a sweeping victory in Nyasaland's first general election on August 14, winning 22 out of the 28 elected seats in the new 33-seat Legislative Council, including all 20 of the positions on the lower voters' roll. Five Malawi candidates, including Dr. Banda, were returned unopposed. The United Federal Party, governing party of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, took five seats and a Malawi-backed European independent rounds out the Council.

A total of 95.6 of the 110,000 voters registered on the lower roll participated in the election—a percentage described by the Supervisor of the Elections as "almost unprecedented in any country." On the higher roll, 3,725 votes were cast, or 84.6 of those registered. No report of trouble came from any of the 233 polling stations, and, according to *East Africa and Rhodesia*, there was "no sign of intimidation."

The new Executive Council announced by Governor Sir Glyn Jones on September 2—still an advisory body at this stage of Nyasaland's constitutional development—contains five British civil servants and five ministers drawn from the elected membership of the Legislative Council. Among the latter group are Dr. Banda, who becomes Minister of National Resources and Local Government; M.W.K. Chiume, Minister of Education; A. W. Bwanausi, Min-

ister of Labor and Social Development; M. Mkwandawire, Minister without Portfolio; and independent Colin Cameron, Minister of Works and Transport.

The election was fought by Dr. Banda as a referendum on whether Nyasaland should stay in the Central African Federation and as a personal contest between himself and federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky. The landslide victory was attributed by most observers to Dr. Banda's personality, the focus on the federal issue, and the streamlined organization of the Malawi Congress Party achieved by Aleke Banda, no relative of the senior Banda but his chief administrative assistant.

Voters of Ruanda Reject Monarchy

Incomplete returns from the general election and plebiscite held in the Belgian-administered UN trust territory of Ruanda on September 25 indicated an 80 to 85 percent majority for the republican *Parmehutu* party. There was also a strong vote against the return of King Kigeri V to the throne. The Ruanda monarchy was deposed in a republican coup in January, but Belgian authorities took over direct rule of the country pending elections and more recently took King Kigeri into custody.

The vote reflects tribal rather than ideological cleavages: the *Parmehutu* is the principal party of the country's majority tribal grouping, the Bahutu, which represents 80 percent of the Ruanda population and has only recently asserted itself against the traditional ruling aristocracy, the Watutsi. King Kigeri's unpopularity at the polls stems chiefly from his Watutsi origins and the transfer of Belgian sympathies to the Bahutu in recent years.

Senegal's Prime Minister Views Socialist Models

Senegal's Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, an economist by profession, concluded mid-summer visits to Sweden, Denmark, and Yugoslavia with some thoughtful comments to the press in Paris on the relative applicability of the three countries' economic systems to Africa's needs. It was his view that the kind of socialism practiced in Scandinavia—pragmatic and non-doctrinaire—was a more useful model for Senegal than the doctrinaire Marxist approach of Yugoslavia. He said that his Scandinavian visit had confirmed his view that it will be possible for Senegal to establish a socialist society without nationalizing industry.

Sierra Leone Voted 100th UN Member

Sierra Leone became the 100th member of the United Nations on September 26, when the Security Council voted unanimously in favor of its application. The West African republic, which became independent from British colonial rule in April 1961, is the 27th African member of the UN.

Verwoerd Announces October Election

South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced on August 1 that general elections would be held in the republic on October 18, some 18 months earlier than required by law. The Nationalist Party, which has held power for the past 13 years on a platform of republicanism and apartheid, apparently is convinced that this is the optimum time to seek a mandate for another five years. If the economic situation in South Africa were to deteriorate in the next two years—as many observers think it will—it might not be as easy to rally public opinion for a clear-cut victory by 1963.

The announcement of the election was accompanied by several ministerial changes which appeared to reaffirm the government's determination to exclude from policymaking roles any who have doubts about the rigidity of the existing racial policies. The most significant of these appeared to be the appointment of Minister of Justice Francois Erasmus as Ambassador to Italy, and his replacement in the cabinet by Johannes Vorster, who was a leader of the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag movement during World War II. Mr. Vorster is also to be Minister of Education, Arts, and Science. In a bid for support from English-speaking South Africans, the Prime Minister left two cabinet posts open, and hinted strongly that they might go to selected representatives of the English community after the October vote.

The election, which is confined to the white population of about 3,067,000, will be contested by the four parties in Parliament—Dr. Verwoerd's Nationalists, the United Party, the Progressives, and the National Union—and also by the Liberal Party, which has no seats in the legislature. The United Party, which stands for a somewhat milder form of white supremacy than the governing Nationalists, has reached an electoral agreement with the recently-established National Union Party founded by former Nationalist MP Japie Basson.

Portugal Announces Ambiguous Reforms

Portuguese Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira announced on August 28 a series of reforms with the stated objective of improving the economic and social lot of the people of Portugal's eight "overseas provinces." Although no mention was made of the rebellion in Angola, which has claimed the lives of some 2,000 Portuguese and up to 50,000 Africans, since it began in February, the new plans are everywhere interpreted as Lisbon's olive branch to a critical world.

The steps outlined by the Overseas Minister would abolish the long-standing legal distinction between those relatively few privileged Africans who have "assimilated." Portuguese culture and civilization and the vast majority of tribal Africans. Henceforth, all will be citizens of Portugal, sharing the same constitutional rights "with no distinction of race, religion, or culture." However, the vote will be limited to those Africans who learn to read and write Portuguese and who can pay 200 escudos (\$7.00) per year in taxes, thus sharply limiting the African role unless there is drastic improvement in the economic and educational opportunities open to the average African. Other changes mentioned include the introduction of collective bargaining and collective wage agreements, reorganization of the administration of justice, and extension of laws governing land rights to better assure the rights of occupants.

The literacy and income voting qualifications specified by Dr. Moreira, together with a simultaneous announcement that Portugal intends to take immediate steps to encourage the rapid expansion of white settlement in all its overseas territories, suggested to most observers that the reforms were alleviative in nature and represented no basic change in Portuguese colonial policy.

Cameroun Federation Requires New Flag

Two gold stars were scheduled to be added to the green, red, and yellow flag of the Republic of Cameroun on October 1, marking the official absorption of the adjacent former British trust territory of Southern Cameroons.

The draft constitution for the enlarged state—henceforth to be known as the Cameroun Federation—was approved by the Cameroun National Assembly on September 7. It provides for Yaounde to continue as the capital and for the establishment of a new National Federal Assembly of

50 members, to be elected by universal adult suffrage. There will be 40 members for the 3,000,000 people of French-speaking East Cameroun and 10 for the 800,000 citizens of English-speaking West Cameroun. Both territories will also maintain regional assemblies. Federal authority will cover external relations, foreign trade, defense, security, and various other centralized activities.

Cameroun President Ahmadou Ahidjo will be chief executive of the federation with Southern Cameroons Prime Minister John Foncha as vice-president. (For discussion of the history of this merger, see *Africa Report*, May 1961, page 3; and February 1961, page 5.)

New European Party In Southern Rhodesia

The formation of a new liberal political party—to be called the New Africa Party—was announced in Southern Rhodesia on July 31. Its leaders, two Rhodesian Europeans once bitter rivals, are former Prime Minister Garfield Todd, a long-time liberal, and Dr. Ahrn Palley, member of Parliament and formerly a leader of the right-wing Dominion Party.

The new party assumes the inevitability of an African majority government in Southern Rhodesia within a decade, and conceives its task as that of preparing white opinion for the transition. More specifically, the aims are: (1) the immediate formation of an Afro-European government, i.e., one in which both Africans and Europeans hold executive positions; (2) early widening of the franchise qualifications so that all the inhabitants can take part in government; (3) abolition of all color bars; and (4) the repeal of the controversial Land Apportionment Act.

"People's Conference" Is Held in Nigeria

The All-Nigerian People's Conference on African Affairs, a unique government-sponsored forum called to allow all shades of public opinion to air their views on the role Nigeria should assume in Africa, ended its three-day session in Lagos August 21 in open controversy over a final resolution calling for Nigeria to "accept in principle the political union of African states on a continental basis and . . . explore the possibility of a unified African common defence." Nigerian Youth Congress President Dr. Tunji Otegbeye and Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Information Mbazulike Amechi accused Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe,

Personal Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs and chairman of the Conference, of having modified undemocratically the wording of the resolution, which originally called for Nigeria to declare itself unequivocally in favor of a political union of African states and an African High Command.

Other resolutions adopted by the conference called for (1) a Nigerian initiative to "bring together" the Monrovia and Casablanca powers, including an invitation for the Casablanca group to attend the next Monrovia meeting, scheduled for Lagos; (2) the removal of the United Kingdom High Commissioner's residence to a site more distant from the Prime Minister's residence; (3) an invitation to Soviet Premier Khrushchev to visit Nigeria; (4) the sending of a delegation to Kenya to invite Jomo Kenyatta to visit Nigeria; (5) the establishment of an Institute of African and International Studies in Lagos; and (6) abrogation of the 1960 Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact.

Dahomey Takes Over Portuguese Enclave

According to news reports, the government of Dahomey celebrated the first anniversary of its independence on August 1 by seizing the tiny Portuguese enclave of Ajuda and expelling the chief Portuguese official to neighboring Nigeria. Vice-President Sourou Mignan Apithy presided at ceremonies in which the Dahomey flag was raised over the ruins of the Portuguese official's residence, which he burned before departing.

Ajuda, a dependency of Sao Tome and Principe, Portuguese-owned islands in the Gulf of Guinea about 125 miles off the coast of Africa, is located in Ouidah, a minor Dahomean port on the Gulf of Guinea. The enclave's principal feature is the Portuguese fort of Sao Joao Baptista de Ajuda, founded in 1788.

Mauritanian President Wins By 97.7 Percent

Final official tabulations for the August 22 general elections in Mauritania gave President Moktar Ould Daddah—the only candidate—97.7 percent of the total votes cast. Of Mauritania's 397,588 eligible voters, 371,818—or 93.5 percent—voted, 370,970 in favor of the single ticket.

President Ould Daddah was elected under the banner of the *Union Nationale Mauritanienne*, a national union party created by the merger of his *Parti du Regroupement Mauritanien* and the formerly pro-Moroccan *Nahda Party* in June. (See *Africa Report*, August 1961, page 12.)

US African Scholars to Meet in New York

The annual meeting of the African Studies Association will take place this year at the Roosevelt Hotel in New York on October 20, 21, and 22.

Past annual meetings of the Association have taken place in September, but this year the Fellows of the Association voted to hold their meeting immediately prior to the Biennial National Conference of the National Commission of UNESCO, to be held in Boston on October 23-26. Since the UNESCO meeting will be on Africa, it is expected that many of those attending the Studies Association will also be present at the meeting in Boston. The National Commission has invited a number of African guests to the United States for its conference and these guests have also been invited to attend the ASA New York gathering.

The African Studies Association now has a membership of over 300 Fellows (those who are actively engaged in teaching or research on Africa) and nearly 600 associates (anyone who has an interest in African Affairs). A special student

membership is available to students working on Africa in schools and universities. The Association acts as a clearing house for information on African studies in the United States and abroad, and publishes a quarterly *Bulletin of African Studies* containing information on African research in progress. Associate members are, of course, welcomed to the Annual Meeting and receive the publication of the Association.

The program of the annual meeting will consist of a number of panels at which papers of scholarly interest will be read and discussed. The panels are designed to cover the major geographic areas of Africa and the chief academic disciplines interested in Africa. A feature of this year's program will be a discussion on American aid to African education, to be chaired by Alan Pifer of the Carnegie Corporation. Further information regarding the annual meeting, and about the work of the Association may be obtained from the Executive Secretary, Professor L. Gray Cowan, at 409 West 117th Street, New York 27, N. Y.

The Political Outlook in Zanzibar

(Continued from page 6)

lock, the June election was scheduled and a new constituency was carved out of the Old Stone Town in Zanzibar City. The ASP protested that the added seat gave the ZNP unfair advantage.

Agreement on Economic Plight

All the parties now agree that independence must come soon and that an East African Federation will call for careful consideration. Within these areas of broad agreement there are naturally some particulars of strong disagreement, but there is almost complete accord from all quarters about Zanzibar's urgent need to develop. Britain is blamed for allowing the protectorate's once-flourishing economy to stagnate but actually the causes of Zanzibar's current economic difficulties are much more complicated than most politicians would lead one to believe.

These small islands long ago lost their importance on East Africa's main trade route. An economy once dependent upon the re-export of slaves now depends on the export of cloves and coconuts and on a transient tourist trade. Zanzibar's cloves—the unopened buds of an evergreen tree—fill 80 percent of the world's needs, but the demand has dropped in recent years. Indonesia, which buys cloves to scent cigarettes, has curtailed its purchases for foreign exchange rea-

sons. And to make matters worse, the Zanzibar Clove Growers Association (in effect, a marketing board) holds one and a half year's surplus in its warehouses—cloves fortunately do not deteriorate—and it expects a bumper crop of 17,000 tons this year.

To progress, all parties and the British officials agree that Zanzibar must diversify its agriculture and seek new uses for cloves and new countries to which to export them. Unhappily, and despite efforts by research firms in New York and London, the world's oldest spice evidently has little versatility. No amount of fancy packaging seems to induce the housewife to buy more and bigger cloves.

Zanzibar's economic plans are therefore centered on the utilization of coconuts and copra more efficiently, on an intensification in the growing of chillies, in a search for new markets and essential oils and essences, and on the planting of cocoa trees. Recently the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund allocated £74,000 for cocoa development here and many have great hopes for its future as an earner of foreign exchange. None look to industrialization as an answer to the islands' economic plight, but Sheikh Ali envisages a large resort hotel which would draw Americans to Zanzibar's coral sands, lapped by the warm Indian Ocean waters.

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Meaning of Belgrade

(Continued from page 7)

is changing. According to recent Communist statements of policy, it is no longer enough to be "national bourgeoisie" and vaguely progressive; a higher stage, much closer to Communism ("National Democracy") should be reached soon by the non-aligned countries, unless, like Cuba, they have entered it already. Unfortunately for the Communists, neither Nehru or Nasser, neither U Nu nor Sukarno show any inclination to retire from the scene because they will soon have outlived (in Communist eyes) their usefulness; on the contrary they (or their successors) will fight for their political survival. Therefore, it is highly likely that the neutrals rather than the West may directly clash with the Communist bloc in the years ahead. The Soviet leaders would of course prefer to postpone this conflict, but prodded by the Chinese, who are much less worried by the prospect of breaking with the neutrals, and compelled by the momentum of their military ideology, there is little they can do to prevent a clash. The best they can hope for is a split among the neutrals.

Quite a few observers returned from Belgrade convinced that Western policies should not be much influenced in future by any hope of winning the uncommitted world to its side. This should have been obvious for a long time, and the neutrals cannot be accused of having misled the West about their intentions. But bitterness that is the child of illusions should not lead us to reject a Western policy of masterful inactivity vis-a-vis the neutral world, and an equal measure of patience and firmness.

Apter Explores Buganda

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Book Editor

The Political Kingdom in Uganda, A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism, by David E. Apter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 498 pages, \$10.

Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950, by M. G. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 371 pages, \$8.

In the realm of "newspaper Africa" the main issue is always "what's new?" Change is unidimensional. Modernity enflames and gradually shatters traditionalism. Secularized nationalist politicians coerce tribal chiefs, slowly, but with mounting effectiveness, into relinquishing the accoutrements of power—even down to their ceremonial robes.

While it is an exciting stereotype—and not completely useless—this picture ignores a fortuitous gift from Africa to the analysis of its societies. Because the period of political subordination to European authority has been comparatively brief, "modernity" has not been able to penetrate very deeply or evenly into native cultures. The analyst therefore is permitted to inspect and appreciate indigenous societies in different circumstances and in various stages of transition. But more important, it means that traditional political systems are more significant for contemporary and future patterns of development.

Traditions Prove Resilient

The point is not that certain traditions resist change; rather, that particular traditional political systems prove hardy and resilient under pressure from European demands and controls. In fact, as Professor Apter and Dr. Smith show in their respective works, traditional authorities can filter and accommodate the forces of change in a manner that permits a gain rather than a loss of influence in the development of new political orders.

The kingdom of Buganda and the Fulani chiefdom of Zaria in Northern Nigeria are among the least fragile of Africa's traditional systems. For that reason alone their structure and transformations bear scrutiny. Professor Apter, a political scientist well-known to American scholars who now teaches at the University of California in Berkeley, and Dr. Smith, an anthropologist from the West Indies (who served briefly at the other University of California, in Los Angeles), are not content, however, with observation and description, although there is excellent reporting and narration in both their studies. Both authors attempt a more exacting task: the development of an analytical scheme with which to test

their ideas about the observed process of political change—and lack of it. Success is therefore partially measured in terms of what can be revealed by systematic construction of testable generalizations. (Dr. Smith's investigation is distinguished also by its use of historical chronicles and the accounts of old men.)

Lest this characterization frighten off more casual readers, it should be noted that the authors take some pains to give the outsider a "feel" for human relationships and the practical problems of existence. Professor Apter in particular conveys something of the delights and diversities of Kiganda life, skillfully mixing this with more astringent analysis.

Neither book is easy reading, but both repay close attention, for they enrich our knowledge of comparative government, history, and colonial policy, as well as enlarge our understanding of the process of political adaptation and the structure of African societies. Significant contributions to the study of African politics, they may furnish important yardsticks in the advancement of political and social science as well.



Apter's theme is the traditionalization of change in Buganda. For years Kiganda society has puzzled both analysts and nationalist agitators. Here was a system that was able to absorb what elsewhere was a corrosive exposure to Christianity and commercialism and yet retain—in some ways strengthen—the identification of the populace with the modified autocratic rule of the Kabaka. Apter suggests the concept of "modernizing autocracy" to emphasize Buganda's "secular traditionalism and its easy response to innovation."

The apparent paradox of Buganda life is explained initially in the decline in influence of the older clan groupings, a phenomenon helped along by the cultivation of the Kabaka and his bureaucracy by missionaries and the British administration during the establishment of the Protectorate. Instead of a "pyramidal" system of corporate social groupings, in which authority would inhere in many levels and localities, the Baganda evolved a "hierarchical" system of unimpeded vertical lines of authority, capped by

the single reverential figure of the Kabaka.

Related is a distinctive value system. The Baganda exemplify a people whose religious beliefs and social proprieties did not infiltrate every relationship and activity. In Apter's terms, their values were "instrumental" and not "consummatory," enabling the Baganda to discard traditions within the existing social framework. (Among the Ashanti of Ghana, for example, opposite conditions obtained and modification of the society had to come from outside the social system, borne in by alienated "modernizers.")

Nationalism develops, but it is focused through the Kabaka, "narrow, ethnic, and xenophobic." In a sense the state of Buganda itself became a nationalist party. Nationalist political movements suffered under a pattern of politics that was shattered by cross-cutting rivalries and manipulated by a bureaucracy of client-chiefs. As a result, efforts to form a loosely organized, federal type ("consociational") party or a well-integrated, militant ("mobilization") party have foundered in a sea of conflicting challenges to the Kabaka's claim to represent the legitimate political will of the Baganda.

Fulani Polity Viewed

The position of the emirate of Zaria can be adjudged even more formidable. Dr. Smith casts his analytical net over a more limited area, confining his attentions to structural changes in the governing system in Zazzau (the older territorial name) through three major eras, the Habe kingdom, the Fulani conquest state, and the Anglo-Fulani administration. Leaving aside the theoretical significance of the author's treatment of the nature of government and his derived laws of structural change, both of which may raise more problems of method than they solve, the discussion clearly shows the tenacity of several critical features of Fulani political patterns during modern times.

In Smith's view, "indirect rule was a method of political association" and not domination, for it left the development of relationships between Fulani rulers and British overlords open to political manipulation. Consequently, the Fulani tried to limit the impact of change at every opportunity.

In the important area of appointments to the Native Administration, the persistence of traditional relationships and solidarities frustrated the endeavors of the British to introduce Western standards and techniques for accession to and maintenance of office. The Emir was able to reduce the authority of the Chief Judge—and

subvert any intentions of creating a more independent judiciary—by the shrewd utilization of powers to transfer and rearrange his principal advisers.

The effect of British overrule was to solidify the power of the emirs in a quasi-feudal system, rather than to subject both rulers and system to effective limitations. The ties of client and patron, according to Smith, continue to express "the structure of political relations in the emirate." It remains a system of paternalism, which sometimes flexes caste and class differences, but which normally can also mask the inheritance of obligations and disabilities of people who remain subject to a system not unlike the slavery illegalized by the British. In addition, British policy restricted the base of aristocratic power by appointing rulers from the same dynasty, severely reducing the competition among four rival lineages which Fulani tradition had previously permitted. (Smith calls the contemporary system "a qualified monodynastic autocracy.") Coupled with solid hierarchical stratification of society and the maintenance of vassal-lord territorial connections, a narrow phalanx of aristocracy is enabled to retain political control. Finally, the multiplication of administrative posts under British supervision allowed the ruling dynasty to entrench its power through increased opportunities for patronage. Indeed Smith describes the

government of Zaria emirate in 1950 as "an autocracy ineffectively supervised by the British."

Smith's concluding observations are significant and perhaps a trifle ominous. The advent of parliamentary government in the North and federalism in Nigeria represents developments "which ironically permit the revival of those political forms which belong to the heyday of empire." The struggle to withstand British pressures toward democracy and against southern pressures toward federal dominance "have stimulated the restoration of active solidarities and imperial relations among the ruling Fulani and within the next few years we may witness an open restoration of the Fulani Empire."

Authors' Conclusions Complementary

The conclusions of both writers complement one another. Apter points out that a federal system is probably most appropriate for countries that embody powerful traditional polities, if these countries are to prevent the growth of a territory-wide autocracy. Such a condition Apter finds proportional to the degree of governmental antagonism to tradition. Smith predicts a revitalized autocracy in Northern Nigeria. This paradox of respecting autocracy to establish democracy should stimulate politicians as well as scholars for many years to come and both groups are sure to traverse the trails pioneered by these two studies.

Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa, by Charles R. Boxer and Carlos de Azevedo (London: Hollis and Carter, 1960), 144 pages, 21s.

The decision of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation to restore and rehabilitate that remarkable Portuguese citadel in Mombasa, Fort Jesus, has been the origin of some controversy. African nationalist leaders regard the project as one more colonialist affront, while defenders of the Portuguese cause in Africa acclaim the decision as a vital testimony to the historical endurance of the Portuguese presence in Africa. Whatever the merits of each side of the controversy, students of African history at least may be grateful that the Foundation saw fit at the same time to sponsor the publication of essays by Charles R. Boxer, the foremost authority on the Portuguese colonial empire, and by the distinguished Portuguese scholar Carlos de Azevedo.

Professor Boxer's masterful 70-page essay considers Portuguese enterprise along that section of the "coast of Zanj" from Kismayu to Kilwa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Portuguese activity in this backwater of the eastern empire is one of the extraordinary fragments of Portugal's colonial history, and Professor

Boxer recounts in scholarly yet vivid detail how a handful of Portuguese merchants and administrators—there were seldom more than a hundred of them residing along the whole coast at any given time—connived, traded, whored, and fought during the two centuries of their tenuous dominance. Professor Boxer describes the importance of the various Swahili city states (Malindi, Pate, Mombasa, and Kilwa) and their political and mercantile associations with the European intruder. He brings into perspective the limited importance of the area within the overall Portuguese policy in the East and concludes that Portugal's responsibility for the disintegration of the once prosperous Swahili settlements has been exaggerated.

Sr. Azevedo's 30-page essay is an appraisal of the design and construction of Fort Jesus itself. Quite apart from its merits as a work of fortification, he regards the structure as "an exceptional example of the philosophical preoccupations underlying architectural theory of the High Renaissance" and the culminating point of Italianate military architecture.

The work is richly illustrated, contains various appendices of historical and architectural value, and a useful bibliography.

—James Duffy

BOOKS RECEIVED:

1. *The Prester John of the Indies*, "A True Relation of the Lands of the Prester John, being the narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Ethiopia in 1520, written by Father Francisco Alvares," translation of Lord Stanley (1881), revised and edited with additional material by C. F. Beckingham and G. W. B. Huntingford, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, Hakluyt Society Publications Nos. 113, 114, 1961) 617 pages, \$13 set. Reissue of famous journals.

2. *L'Unité Culturelle de L'Afrique Noire*, by C. A. Diop (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959), 203 pages, n.p. Comparative sociology, theory, and practice.

3. *Report of the Commonwealth Conference on the Teaching of English as a Second Language*, at Makerere College, Uganda (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961), 56 pages, 4s.

4. *Taboo, A Study of Malagasy Customs and Beliefs*, by Jorgen Ruid (Oslo: University Press, London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), 325 pages, 27s. 6d. Anthropological study.

5. *Selective Soviet Annotated Bibliographies: Asia, Africa, Latin America*, vol. 1, no. 1, May 1961 (Soviet and East European Research and Translation Service, 246 E. 51 St., N.Y.C.) New quarterly of abstracts from Communist journals. \$4 a year.

6. *Kingsway Mathematics*, by S. Ewart Williams, West African Editions, edited by A. H. Parnaby (London: Evans Brothers, 1961). Four school books and a teachers' book, from 5s. 9d. to 7s. 6d.

7. *Explorers in Africa*, by Jardine Parr (London: Evans Brothers, 1961), 64 pages, 2s. 9d. First of a new series for African schools.

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NOTES

8. Following is the first part of an area-by-area survey of recent noteworthy articles in non-Africanist periodicals. (The Book Editor regrets that he is unable to continue coverage of weeklies and bi-weeklies. To insure attention, scholars are respectfully invited to forward reprints of articles.)

West Africa—Sayre P. Schatz, "Underutilized Resources, 'Directed Demand' and Deficit Financing (Illustrated by Reference to Nigeria)," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. 78, Nov. 1959: Rather than depending on production (supply) alone to create demand necessary to activate partially idle resources, this formulation holds that "appropriately 'directed demand' — government provisions of cash payments in community development programs and government provision of markets for handicraft and certain primary products, financed out of moderate deficits — "may bring about the productive employment of underutilized resources." For discussion of actual planning efforts by the pre-independence government of Nigeria, see

Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1898-1945, by Margery Perham (London: Collins, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 748 pages, \$8.

Margery Perham's authorized biography of Frederick Dealtry Lugard is an enduring credit to the account of British imperialism. Volume I, *The Years of Adventure*, published in 1956, covered Lugard's army career and his experience in the service of several empire-building commercial companies in tropical Africa. Volume II, *The Years of Authority*, is an admiring portrait of a proconsul who, at the turn of the century, constructed, in Northern Nigeria, "the most comprehensive, coherent and renowned system of administration in (British) colonial history." Subsequently, he presided over the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, serving as Governor-General of the unified dependency from 1914-1918.

Lugard, rather than Rhodes, was the incarnation of Kipling's legendary hero in tropical Africa. A genuine paternalist, he condemned, equally, the pecuniary greed of the European trader and the impetuous radicalism of the "educated native." His individualistic mode of administration was the subject of incessant criticism by functionaries in the Colonial Office. Following his somewhat abrupt retirement from active service, he wrote a classic book on colonial government and devoted the last 26 years of his life to humane, scholarly, and liberal causes, relating mainly to Africa.

Lugard's marriage, in his forties, to a woman of frail health who had previously been colonial editor of *The Times* of London, was burdened by long separations, producing a voluminous correspondence of unique value to a political biography. For his wife, a lioness of the Imperial Establish-

ment, was an adept manipulator of statesmen and a singularly resourceful propagandist in his behalf. Hoping vainly that transfer to a more temperate clime would put an end to their separations, Lugard interrupted his African work for five years to serve with distinction as Governor of Hong Kong. He returned to Nigeria for the historic task of amalgamation, with a grudging concession from the Colonial Offices to the effect that, in lieu of regular leave, he would be allowed to administer Nigeria from London for one-third of each year. It appears that, for the sake of this scheme, he was anxious to preserve the established administrative routines with a minimum of reorganization, and for that reason mainly he resolved to retain the existing division of Nigeria in two parts—the Northern and Southern Provinces. It is a revealing reflection on the nature of colonial government that a personal consideration might lie at the root of an administrative decision that was second to none in importance in Nigerian history.

Moreover, Lugard's refusal to partition the vast Northern territory into smaller units and his opposition to the creation of a large central secretariat appear to have been inconsistent with his more fundamental administrative policies. Lugard's system, a form of Indirect Rule, comprehended the government of indigenous societies through the medium of their traditional authorities. It was designed primarily for the large centralized Moslem emirates of northern Nigeria, and its application to the non-centralized, non-authoritarian political systems of southern Nigeria was, in the main, a failure, inviting condemnation as a reactionary alliance "between imperial and tribal authority." In Northern Nigeria, the system was based upon the support and "regenera-

tion" of an unpopular and oppressive "ruling caste," which was obliged to humanize its rule, but secured in power by British protection.

Miss Perham explains the circumstantial logic behind this policy, without trying to justify it, but shows in extenuation that Lugard viewed the African emir or chief as a "dependent ruler" to whom administrative power had been delegated by the Imperial sovereign. It was not his intention to preserve the emirates as quasi-independent, potentially self-governing native states, and he resisted the efforts of his superiors and subordinates to pursue that ideal. Miss Perham suggests that Lugard's policy was attenuated by the "autonomous state" school, in particular with respect to the creation of distinct Native Treasuries, with the result that uniformity and centralization were sacrificed in the north, and an extreme political contrast between the north and the south was bequeathed to modern Nigeria.

But Lugard was an inconsistent centralizer. We might, on the basis of Miss Perham's account, conclude that he differed with the "autonomous state" school more in degree than in principle. Probably he never perceived the implicit corporatist implications of Indirect Rule, which emerge in the thought of his fascinating, pseudo-socialistic opponent, Sir Charles Temple. If his implementation of administrative policy was indecisive, the explanation lies less in the circumstances of his private life than in the fact that Indirect Rule, as practiced by Lugard, was the child of expedience rather than political principle. Its theoretical content, a matter of controversy, may be inferred from the experience that this biography has lucidly and provocatively considered.

—Richard L. Sklar

the same author's "The Influence of Planning on Development: the Nigerian Experience," *Social Research*, Winter 1960: A haphazard and uncoordinated approach is adjudged to have denied the country more rapid and more effective achievement of goals. ●L. Proudfoot and H. S. Wilson, "The Clubs in Crisis: Race Relations in the New West Africa," *American Journal of Sociology*, v. 66, Jan. 1961: Based on experience in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the authors note that Africans desire the "right" of entrance and less the effective use of heretofore exclusive European social clubs, while whites permit symbolic contacts and resist habitual ones. ●Two superficially Marxist treatments are interesting as a sign of possible future trends: Alphaeus Hunton, "Guinea Strides Forward;"

John Pittman, "How Socialist States Help Africa and Why," *Freedomways*, *Quarterly Review of the Negro Freedom Movement*, v. 1, Spring 1961. ●Douglas Rimmer, "The New Industrial Relations in Ghana," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, v. 14, Jan. 1961: A comprehensive review of the development of trade unionism in Ghana and an evaluation of the efforts of the government to make trade unions an arm of the state—a goal which has apparently been achieved.

Central and Southern Africa—●John S. Conway, "Central African Enquiry," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, v. 27, May 1961: A review of the Report of the Monckton Commission, indicating that no new "Central African ideology" has emerged. The majority

view is ambiguous and overly-hopeful and the author concludes that political results will probably be settled by "blood and iron" and not by reason. ●Noteworthy periodical: *The Samkange Newsletter*, a confidential monthly report by a prominent African (9 Wonder Shopping Centre, Kingsway, Salisbury, S.R., \$14 sea, \$17 air.) ●Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," *Journal of Politics*, v. 22, Nov. 1960: Emphasizes that while apartheid was a winning slogan in 1948, it was not a completely new departure in policy. What is new is the determination and effective power to implement it. South Africa's Nationalists have progressed systematically, with no major changes from election statements made 13 years ago.

African Visitors to the U. S.

GENERAL IBHAHIM ABOUD, President of the Republic of the Sudan, in the US on a State Visit from October 4-14. For details, contact the Embassy of Sudan, 2346 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington 8, DC.

ALHAJI SHEHU AHMED, Chief of Staff of Kano Emirate in Northern Nigeria and Deputy to the Emir of Kano; and **ALHAJI MUHAMMADU**, Chief Councillor of the Kazaure Native Authority, in the US until early November on State Department leader grants. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

CYPRION ZOUNGRANA, Vice President of the Upper Volta National Assembly, in the US until late October on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

REMI ADE B. FANI-KAYODE, barrister and Leader of the Opposition in the Western Nigeria House of Assembly, in the US until mid-December on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

DUNDUZU KALULI CHISIZA, Secretary General of the Malawi Congress Party, Nyasaland, due in the US on October 1 for a 60-day State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

FRANCOIS N'LIBA, Director General of the Camerounian Development Bank, in the US until early October on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

ABDOU RAKMANE CISSE, a Senegalese journalist in training at the Center for the Formation of Journalists in Paris; and **ABABAKAR SAMBA**, a Senegalese actor and student of cinematography who has just completed a course at the *Centro Sperimentale Del Cinema* in Rome, in the US until November 16 on State Department cultural and education grants. Programmed by the African-American Institute, Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington 6, DC.

D.A.R. ALEXANDER, The Solicitor-General and Permanent Secretary to the Western Nigeria Ministry of Justice, due in the US from October 3-11 under the auspices of the State Department voluntary leaders program, to exchange ideas with senior law officers in Washington and New York. For details, contact Miss Helen Davis, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange, Department of State, Washington 25, DC.

EBUN OLAWOYE, Senior Engineer in the Western Nigeria Housing Corporation, in the US until October 6 on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

DAHIR HAGI OSMAN SCER-MARCHE, chief of all provincial governors and district commissioners in the Somali Ministry of Interior; and **AHMED DAHIR**, Magistrate of Accounts, Government of Somalia, in the US until mid-November on State Department leader grants. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

CHRISTOPHER CHINAMHORA, a businessman in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, in the US until October 6 on a State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

ALBERT ERNEST CHINBUAH, Principal Secretary of the Ghana Ministry of Agriculture, arrived in the US in mid-August for a six-week Rockefeller Travel Grant to study aspects of American agriculture.

AYODELE OKUSAGA, Chairman of the Western Nigeria Housing Corporation, in the US until October 9 on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

ERNEST MILCENT, Editor of *Afrique Nouvelle* (Dakar), due in the US from October 22-December 4 on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

JEAN POISSON, Director of the Section of Cooperatives and Housing in the Niger Ministry of Rural Economy, in the US until mid-November on a State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

ABDOU SIDIKOW, Secretary General of the Niger Foreign Ministry, in the US until mid-October on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

TOURE MOMO, radio technician in charge of network in Conakry, Guinea; and **KOUNTA MOULAYE**, radio telegrapher and radio teletypist in Conakry, in the US until early November on State Department specialist grants. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

RAFAEL RAPIERA, owner-editor of *Ny Gazetintsika*, a daily paper in Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, in the US until mid-November on a State Department leader grant. Pro-

grammed by the American Council on Education.

EUGENE I. EKWERIKE, President-General of the Electrical Workers Union of Nigeria and an executive member of the Trades Union Congress of Nigeria, in the US until January 5 on a State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Washington 25, DC.

RAPHAEL SYLVANUS AMEGASHIE, Principal of the College of Education, Ghana, in the US until mid-October on a State Department leader grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education.

Among a group of public administrators in the US until January 7 to participate in a State Department-sponsored Public Administration Group Project are: **ARTHUR JOSEPH KINYA**, Medical Officer of Health in Kenya's Embu District; **JOSEPH MUSEMBI**, District Officer of Kisi District in Kenya; **PETER JOSEPH GACHATHI**, District Officer in the Kenya Provincial Administration; **SAMUEL STANFORD WATTS**, Magistrate of Elections in Cape Palmas, Liberia; and **SIRA EGWEU**, Secretary General of the Teso District Administration in Uganda. After a one-month seminar ending October 14 at the University of Pittsburgh, members of the group will follow separate itineraries for travel in the United States. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Calendar

October 20-22: Annual meeting of the African Studies Association, in New York City. See page 12, this issue, for details.

October 22-26: Eighth National Conference of the US National Commission for UNESCO, at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts, to discuss "Africa and the United States: Images and Realities." The Conference, to be attended by 1740 delegates and 158 panelists, including leading American Africanists and outstanding African personalities, will be divided into sections for Education, Science, Culture, and Communication. Among those participating are President Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Nigeria's Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku. Attendance by invitation. For details, contact the US National Commission for UNESCO, Department of State, Washington 25, DC.

October 19-23: Meeting of The Friends of Africa, in Chicago, to discuss "Our Stake in Africa." For details, contact Sidney Williams, President of The Friends of Africa, 5445 Dorchester Avenue, Chicago 15, Illinois.

